Introduction
Thirty-three delegates from ten different countries (2) convened in Appleton, Wisconsin, USA, from May [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 1988 , under the auspices of the Lawrence University Program in Biomedical Ethics, to create a first draft of what they hoped might become international guidelines for treatment abatement procedures. The delegates attending committed themselves to convene a forum at an appropriate level in their home country or community for further discussion of the statement produced at the conference.
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Twenty-five of the thirty-three delegates were physicians, representing eleven different medical specialisations. Of the eight non-physicians, six had extensive clinical experience in ethics consultations. One of the eight was a medical economist. Seven were bioethicists: two with backgrounds in philosophy, two in theology, two in law, and one in comparative religion and ethics. Several of the delegates had had experience in the creation of important medical ethics guidelines in the past.
Twenty-six of the thirty-three delegates had met together in a preparatory conference one year earlier.
Seven of the delegates were new (3).
Two particular sets of concerns had emerged in the first Appleton working conference: 1) concerns regarding decisions to forego medical treatment, including life-prolonging treatment, precipitated by autonomous requests by patients or their surrogates, and 2) concerns regarding decisions to forego medical treatment as a result of pressures due to scarcity.
The goal of the second international conference was to draft a statement addressing these concerns in the form of guidelines for discussion in medical and medical ethics communities internationally.
The delegates were divided into four working groups (4). In the first three plenary sessions of the conference, the delegates studied existing sets of guidelines (5), discussed the processes of searching for consensus, and set their operational goals for the working sessions. After four working sessions, each working group reported its progress for plenary discussion. During two further group sessions, the working groups reworked their statements in light of the suggestions from the plenary session before preparing a final report to the whole group. Each report was then discussed line by line in two long plenary sessions to produce the following statement.
Preamble: ethical background
In caring for patients, physicians, as individuals and as a profession, should act with integrity in providing medical treatment within certain norms of care and concern. Despite widely diverse national, cultural, religious, and political traditions, four prima facie moral values or principles summarise these norms (6). The physician has the responsibility to discern, to the extent possible, the patient's current medical and social situation, the likely future course of the disease or condition in the absence of intervention, the full range of potentially useful interventions, and the likely course with each of these.
PATIENT'S VALUES HISTORY
The physician also has the obligation to ensure insofar as possible that the patient's own values and preferences in regard to the current situation are ascertained. If the physician can determine that a particular plan of care, including the foregoing ofparticular treatment, is clearly most in accord with the patient's values and if the patient's family and direct caregivers concur, then that plan of care should be pursued.
'BEST INTERESTS' DECISIONS
If the comparative merits of the alternative futures, in the light of the patient's values, do not clearly indicate which plan of care the patient would have preferred, then the physician, in consultation with the family, if available, and other direct care givers, should identify the plan of care that would most generally be thought to advance most such patients' interests; and, if family and direct caregivers concur, it should be implemented. Ordinarily, for example, persons would want to preserve identity, be able to maintain independence and control, be able to interact with others, have pleasurable experiences, avoid pain and suffering, and avoid being a severe burden upon others. Normally treatment must be justified in these terms (1 1).
DISCORD
If there is a conflict between the responsible physician and an involved care giver or family member as to which course of care should be pursued, then procedures must be in place to ensure adequate attention to resolving this discord. Counselling, discussion, consultation, and other informal interventions may bring about significant degrees of agreement (12). If the person(s) who disagree(s) with the physician's recommendation is emotionally and socially distant and there are others who are emotionally and socially close, then the physician may disregard the claims of the more tangential party. However, if the disagreement is with someone close to the patient, the physician should not generally override that view without resorting to more formal conflict resolution processes. These might include intrainstitutional authorities (for example, ethics committees or department heads or administrators) or extra-institutional authorities (for example, the courts). Institutions and programmes of care should have available reliable and responsive procedures that ensure that all relevant considerations are given their due.
SOCIALLY ISOLATED PATIENTS
If the now-incompetent patient has no family or friends, the physician has an especially weighty obligation to ensure that decisions are made well. Not all such patients need personal advocates (for example, guardianships, ombudspersons, public officials), but the physician should consult widely with other direct care givers, consultants, and relevant religious advisors. Some cases may merit formal review either by intra-institutional or extra-institutional authorities before the decision is made by the physician. The need for this prospective review should reflect the degree to which the decision is one with serious and irreversible effects, one with unavoidable uncertainties, one concerning a patient of a group with a history of being treated in a discriminatry manner, or one which is without substantial precedent.
RESTORATION OF COMPETENCE
When it is reasonable to believe that a patient could regain competence before a weighty decision must be made, the decision should be delayed in order to allow the patient the opportunity to make the decision.
FUTILE TREATMENT
A treatment that cannot reasonably be expected to achieve even its physiological objective is physiologically futile and need not be offered nor provided if requested (13). 
2. Assessing quality of life of these patients for purposes of medical decisions involves weighing the ratio of benefits and burdens (17). 3. In most decisions involving patients in this category, at least five sets of interests may be discerned: a) the patient's; b) the surrogate's or family's; c) the physician's and those of other care givers; d) the health care institution's (where continuing or withholding treatment may have religious, financial, and legal implications and may expose it to local or national publicity); e) society's (including both the use of economic resources and the need for research to help future patients).
Normally, the patient's interests should be regarded as paramount. However, difficult moral dilemmas arise when the patient's interests are unclear or clearly conflict with a number of other interests. Societies differ in their preferences for mechanisms for arbitrating conflict in these difficult cases (for example, institutional ethics committee, courts). It is important to remember, however, that in the cases most commonly encountered, the various interests are not necessarily in conflict.
Often the patient's own interest is integrally interwoven with the interest of the family and the community. Part of the physician's clinical wisdom consists of responsibly weighing interests and creatively resolving apparently irreconcilable conflicts. 4. When the patient has a surrogate, the physician's obligation to the patient also requires certain duties towards the surrogate. These include: a) providing accurate information about the specific clinical problems; b) being honest; c) applying skills in effective communication; d) being willing to answer any questions that are asked; e) being aware of broader social and moral implications.
To act in a way that recognises these duties to the surrogate is to be worthy of the trust that one hopes the surrogate will place in the physician, so that a policy of mutual and shared decision-making may be fostered. When the patient is a child with an emerging capacity to participate in the decision-making process, both physician and surrogate demonstrate respect by responding to questions and concerns at a level consistent with the child's cognitive and moral development. 5. While the physician is required to act in a trustworthy manner towards the patient and surrogate, the range ofinterests that could conflict (see Part Part IV: Scarcity (19) Growing needs and demands, a growing range of increasingly costly medical options, and diminishing resources compel us to recognise that it is not feasible to offer all beneficial treatments that are medically possible to all patients. Necessarily, all communities face scarcities. Some instances of scarcity can be addressed by a particular allocation of funds. Others, such as a shortage oforgans for transplant, may involve absolute limitations whch may not be resolved easily within the apparently acceptable range of ethical choices. Scarcity, by definition, requires choice, and any choice in the context of scarcity requires foregoing alternative choices. Societies may deny that they make such choices or disguise the ones they make, but they do so at the price of honesty, justice, and efficiency. Honest responses to situations which require choice may, on the other hand, yield long-term advantages. Scarcity forces societies and institutions to establish priorities which may give rise to more efficient resource use, such as devoting more resources to those medical circumstances where the returns in terms of health outcomes are likely to be the greatest. In determining priorities, given the scarcity of health resources, the following concepts play critical roles:
1. The principle of justice requires universal access to an acceptable, decent minimum of basic health care. 2. What constitutes this acceptable, decent minimum of basic health care will depend on the particular society's general level of affluence and other priorities and hence will vary not only from culture to culture but from time to time (20) . The principal task is to assess other competing values and to make judgements about which health care needs are most pressing and which responses to those needs are reasonable and proportional. 3. When a society decides to declare a right to certain health services for all, it must incorporate into that decision a willingness to give up alternative uses of those resources necessary to deliver such care. 4. If medical decision-making emphasises costeffective therapies, the burdens of satisfying the desired universal access will be markedly reduced. 5. Sometimes relatively unfettered market transactions can do a good job of delivering costeffective health care products and services, but, even when market processes deliver efficiency, they do so at the cost of equitable access; thus, the market-place cannot be the sole determinant ofaccess and priorities.
Guidelines
With these notions in mind, the following guidelines should be considered:
1. Society must establish the limits and the priorities for life-sustaining treatment options. 2. Processes used to establish such limits must be, and be perceived to be, open and fair.
3. Cost effectiveness should be used whenever feasible to inform decisions about appropriate life-prolonging treatments in particular circumstances. Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) should incorporate the best available scientific information about the results of the therapies being considered and all appropriate medical and non-medical costs and benefits -including an assessment of foreseeable changes in the patient's quality of life as a result of the proposed therapies. Although CEA is an invaluable and indispensable tool in making ethical decisions, it is not a simple formula and must not be naively applied. Several caveats are noteworthy. CEA, like all analytical frameworks, requires accurate data which may be extremely difficult and expensive to obtain. Care must be taken to be sure that the interpretation of the data is free from unwarranted extrapolations. Finally CEA must be tempered by sensitivity to human differences and caseby-case application, based on the assessment of particular benefits and burdens for individual patients. 4. CEA-based information, guidelines, and limitations should be quickly and widely distributed. 
